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An international system consists of a group
of interacting behavior units called &dquo;nations&dquo;
or &dquo;countries,&dquo; to which may sometimes be
added certain supra-national organizations,
such as the United Nations.
Each of the behavior units in the sys-
tem can be described in terms of a set of
&dquo;relevant variables.&dquo; Just what is relevant and
what is not is a matter of judgment of the
system-builder, but we think of such things
as states of war or peace, degrees of hostility
or friendliness, alliance or enmity, arms bud-
gets, geographic extent, friendly or hostile
communications, and so on. Having defined
our variables, we can then proceed to postu-
late certain relationships between them, suffi-
cient to define a path for all the variables
through time. Thus we might suppose, with
Lewis Richardson,2 that the rate of change of
hostility of one nation toward a second de-
pends on the level of hostility in the second
and that the rate of change of hostility of the
second toward the first depends on the level
of hostility of the first. Then, if we start from
given levels of hostility in each nation, these
equations are sufficient to spell out what hap-
pens to these levels in succeeding time peri-
ods. A system of this kind may (or may not)
have an equilibrium position at which the
variables of one period produce an identical
set in the next period, and the system exhibits
no change through time.
Mechanical systems of this kind, though
they are frequently illuminating, can be re-
garded only as very rough first approxima-
tions to the immensely complex truth. At the
next level of approximation we must recog-
nize that the people whose decisions deter-
mine the policies and actions of nations do
not respond to the &dquo;objective&dquo; facts of the
situation, whatever that may mean, but to
their &dquo;image&dquo; of the situation. It is what we
think the world is like, not what it is really
like, that determines our behavior. If our im-
age of the world is in some sense &dquo;wrong,&dquo;
of course, we may be disappointed in our ex-
pectations, and we may therefore revise our
image; if this revision is in the direction of
the &dquo;truth&dquo; there is presumably a long-run
tendency for the &dquo;image&dquo; and the &dquo;truth&dquo; to
coincide. Whether this is so or not, it is al-
ways the image, not the truth, that immedi-
ately determines behavior. We act according
to the way the world appears to us, not neces-
sarily according to the way it &dquo;is.&dquo; Thus in
Richardson’s models it is one nation’s image
of the hostility of another, not the &dquo;real&dquo; hos-
tility, which determines its reaction. The im-
age,&dquo; then, must be thought of as the total
cognitive, affective, and evaluative structure
1 This paper was presented to a meeting of the
American Psychological Association in Washing-
ton, D.C., on August 30, 1958.
2 See Anatol Rapoport, "Lewis F. Richardson’s
Mathematical Theory of War," Journal of Con-
flict Resolution, I ( September, 1957), 249, for
an excellent exposition.
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of the behavior unit, or its internal view of
itself and its universe.8 8
Generally speaking, the behavior of com-
plex organizations can be regarded as deter-
mined by decisions, and a decision involves
the selection of the most preferred position
in a contemplated field of choice. Both the
field of choice and the ordering of this field
by which the preferred position is identified
lie in the image of the decision-maker. There-
fore, in a system in which decision-makers are
an essential element, the study of the ways in
which the image grows and changes, both of
the field of choice and of the valuational or-
dering of this field, is of prime importance.
The image is always in some sense a product
of messages received in the past. It is not,
however, a simple inventory or &dquo;pile&dquo; of such
messages but a highly structured piece of
information-capital, developed partly by its
inputs and outputs of information and partly
by internal messages and its own laws of
growth and stability.
The images which are important in inter-
national systems are those which a nation has
of itself and of those other bodies in the sys-
tem which constitute its international envi-
ronment. At once a major complication sug-
gests itself. A nation is some complex of the
images of the persons who contemplate it,
and as there are many different persons, so
there are many different images. The com-
plexity is increased by the necessity for inclu-
sion, in the image of each person or at least
of many persons, his image of the image of
others. This complexity, however, is a prop-
erty of the real world, not to be evaded or
glossed over. It can be reduced to simpler
terms if we distinguish between two types of
persons in a nation-the powerful, on the one
hand, and the ordinary, on the other. This
is not, of course, a sharp distinction. The
power of a decision-maker may be measured
roughly by the number of people which his
decisions potentially affect, weighted by some
measure of the effect itself. Thus the head of
a state is powerful, meaning that his deci-
sions affect the lives of millions of people; the
ordinary person is not powerful, for his deci-
sions affect only himself and the lives of a few
people around him. There is usually a con-
tinuum oi power among the persons of a so-
ciety : thus in international relations there are
usually a few very powerful individuals in a
state-the chief executive, the prime minister,
the secretary of state or minister of foreign
affairs, the chiefs of staff of the armed forces.
There will be some who are less powerful but
still influential-members of the legislature, of
the civil service, even journalists, newspaper
owners, prominent businessmen, grading by
imperceptible degrees down to the common
soldier, who has no power of decision even
over his own life. For purposes of the model,
however, let us compress this continuum into
two boxes, labeled the &dquo;powerful&dquo; and the
&dquo;ordinary,&dquo; and leave the refinements of pow-
er and influence for later studies.
We deal, therefore, with two representa-
tive images, (1) the image of the small group
of powerful people who make the actual de-
cisions which lead to war or peace, the mak-
ing or breaking of treaties, the invasions or
withdrawals, alliances, and enmities which
make up the major events of international
relations, and (2) the image of the mass of
ordinary people who are deeply affected by
these decisions but who take little or no direct
part in making them. The tacit support of
the mass, however, is of vital importance to
the powerful. The powerful are always under
some obligation to represent the mass, even
under dictatorial regimes. In democratic soci-
eties the aggregate influence of the images
of ordinary people is very great; the image
3 See K. E. Boulding, The Image (Ann Arbor:
University of Michigan Press, 1956), for an ex-
position of the theory on which this paper is
based.
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of the powerful cannot diverge too greatly
from the image of the mass without the pow-
erful losing power. On the other hand, the
powerful also have some ability to manipulate
the images of the mass toward those of the
powerful. This is an important object of in-
struments as diverse as the public education
system, the public relations departments of
the armed services, the Russian &dquo;agitprop,&dquo;
and the Nazi propaganda ministry.
In the formation of the national images,
however, it must be emphasized that impres-
sions of nationality are formed mostly in
childhood and usually in the family group.
It would be quite fallacious to think of the
images as being cleverly imposed on the mass
by the powerful. If anything, the reverse is the
case: the image is essentially a mass image, or
what might be called a &dquo;folk image,&dquo; trans-
mitted through the family and the intimate
face-to-face group, both in the case of the
powerful and in the case of ordinary persons.
Especially in the case of the old, long-estab-
lished nations, the powerful share the mass
image rather than impose it; it is passed on
from the value systems of the parents to those
of the children, and agencies of public in-
struction and propaganda merely reinforce
the images which derived essentially from
the family culture. This is much less true in
new nations which are striving to achieve
nationality, where the family culture fre-
quently does not include strong elements of
national allegiance but rather stresses alle-
gience to religious ideals or to the family as
such. Here the powerful are frequently in-
spired by a national image derived not from
family tradition but from a desire to imitate
other nations, and here they frequently try
to impose their images on the mass of people.
Imposed images, however, are fragile by
comparison with those which are deeply in-
ternalized and transmitted through family
and other intimate sources.
Whether transmitted orally and informally
through the family or more formally through
schooling and the written word, the national
image is essentially a historical image-that
is, an image which extends through time,
backward into a supposedly recorded or per-
haps mythological past and forward into an
imagined future. The more conscious a peo-
ple is of its history, the stronger the national
image is likely to be. To be an Englishman is
to be conscious of &dquo;1066 and All That&dquo; rather
than of &dquo;Constantine and All That,&dquo; or &dquo;1776
and All That.&dquo; A nation is the creation of its
historians, formal and informal. The written
word and public education contribute enor-
mously to the stability and persistence of the
national images. The Jews, for instance, are a
creation of the Bible and the Talmud, but
every nation has its bible, whether formed
into a canon or not-noble words like the
Declaration of Independence and the Gettys-
burg Address-which crystallize the national
image in a form that can be transmitted al-
most unchanged from generation to genera-
tion. It is no exaggeration to say that the
function of the historian is to pervert the truth
in directions favorable to the images of his
readers or hearers. Both history and geogra-
phy as taught in national schools are devised
to give &dquo;perspective&dquo; rather than truth: that
is to say, they present the world as seen from
the vantage point of the nation. The national
geography is learned in great detail, and the
rest of the world is in fuzzy outline; the na-
tional history is emphasized and exalted; the
history of the rest of the world is neglected
or even falsified to the glory of the national
image.
It is this fact that the national image is
basically a lie, or at least a perspective dis-
tortion of the truth, which perhaps accounts
for the ease with which it can be perverted
to justify monstrous cruelties and wicked-
nesses. There is much that is noble in the
national image. It has lifted man out of the
narrow cage of self-centeredness, or even
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family-centeredness, and has forced him to
accept responsibility, in some sense, for peo-
ple and events far beyond his face-to-face
cognizance and immediate experience. It is
a window of some sort on both space and
time and extends a man’s concern far beyond
his own little lifetime and petty interests.
Nevertheless, it achieves these virtues usually
only at the cost of untruth, and this fatal flaw
constantly betrays it. Love of country is per-
verted into hatred of the foreigner, and peace,
order, and justice at home are paid for by
war, cruelty, and injustice abroad.
In the formation of the national image the
consciousness of great shared events and ex-
periences is of the utmost importance. A na-
tion is a body of people who are conscious
of having &dquo;gone through something&dquo; together.
Without the shared experience, the national
image itself would not be shared, and it is
of vital importance that the national image
be highly similar. The sharing may be quite
vicarious; it may be an experience shared
long ago but constantly renewed by the ritual
observances and historical memory of the
people, like the Passover and the Captivity
in the case of the Jews. Without the sharing,
however, there is no nation. It is for this
reason that war has been such a tragically
important element in the creation and suste-
nance of the national image. There is hardly
a nation that has not been cradled in violence
and nourished by further violence. This is
not, I think, a necessary property of war it-
self. It is rather that, especially in more primi-
tive societies, war is the one experience which
is dramatic, obviously important, and shared
by everybody. We are now witnessing the
almost unique phenomenon of a number of
new nations arising without war in circum-
stances which are extremely rare in history,
for example-India, Ghana, and the new West
Indian Federation, though even here there
are instances of severe violence, such as the
disturbances which accompanied partition in
India. It will be interesting to see the effect,
if any, on their national images.
We now come to the central problem of
this paper, which is that of the impact of
national images on the relations among states,
that is, on the course of events in international
relations. The relations, among states can be
described in terms of a number of different
dimensions. There is, first of all, the dimen-
sion of simple geographical space. It is per-
haps the most striking single characteristic
of the national state as an organization, by
contrast with organizations such as firms or
churches, that it thinks of itself as occupying,
in a &dquo;dense&dquo; and exclusive fashion, a certain
area of the globe. The schoolroom maps
which divide the world into colored shapes
which are identified as nations have a pro-
found effect on the national image. Apart
from the very occasional condominium, it is
impossible for a given plot of land on the
globe to to be associated with two nations
at the same time. The territories of nations
are divided sharply by frontiers carefully sur-
veyed and frequently delineated by a chain
of customs houses, immigration stations, and
military installations. We are so accustomed
to this arrangement that we think of it as
&dquo;natural&dquo; and take it completely for granted.
It is by no means the only conceivable ar-
rangement, however. In primitive societies
the geographical image is not sharp enough
to define clear frontiers; there may be a no-
tion of the rough territory of a tribe, but,
especially among nomadic peoples, there is
no clear concept of a frontier and no notion
of a nation as something that has a shape on
a map. In our own society the shape on the
map that symbolizes the nation is constantly
drilled into the minds of both young and old,
both through formal teaching in schools and
through constant repetition in newspapers,
advertisements, cartoons, and so on. A soci-
ety is not inconceivable, however, and might
even be desirable, in-Which nations governed
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people but not territories and claimed juris-
diction over a defined set of citizens, no mat-
ter where on the earth’s surface they hap-
pened to live.
The territorial aspect of the national state
is important in the dynamics of international
relations because of the exclusiveness of terri-
torial occupation. This means that one nation
can generally expand only at the expense of
another; an increase in the territory of one is
achieved only at the expense of a decrease in
the territory of another. This makes for a
potential conflict situation. This characteristic
of the nation does not make conflict inevita-
ble, but it does make it likely and is at least
one of the reasons why the history of inter-
national relations is a history of perpetual
conflict.
The territorial aspect of international rela-
tions is complicated by the fact that in many
cases the territories of nations are not homo-
geneous but are composed of &dquo;empires,&dquo; in
which the populations do not identify them-
selves with the national image of the domi-
nant group. Thus when one nation conquers
another and absorbs the conquered territory
into an empire, it does not thereby automati-
cally change the culture and allegiances of
the conquered nation. The Poles remained
Polish for a hundred and twenty-five years
of partition between Germany, Austria, and
Russia. The Finns retained their nationality
through eight hundred years of foreign rule
and the Jews, through nearly two thousand
years of dispersion. If a nation loses territory
occupied by disaffected people, this is much
less damaging than the loss of territory in-
habited by a well-disposed and loyal popu-
lation. Thus Turkey, which was the &dquo;sick man
of Europe&dquo; as long as it retained its hetero-
geneous empire, enjoyed a substantial re-
newal of national health when stripped of its
empire and pushed back to the relatively
homogeneous heartland of Anatolia. In this
case the loss of a disaffected empire actually
strengthened the national unit.
The image of the map-shape of the nations
may be an important factor affecting the gen-
eral frame of mind of the nation. There is a
tendency for nations to be uneasy with strong
irregularities, enclaves, detached portions,
and protuberances or hollows. The ideal
shape is at least a convex set, and there is
some tendency for nations to be more satis-
fied if they have regularly round or rectangu-
lar outlines. Thus the detachment of East
Prussia from the body of Germany by the
Treaty of Versailles was an important factor
in creating the fanatical discontent of the
Nazis.
A second important dimension of the na-
tional image is that of hostility or friendliness.
At any one time a particular national image
includes a rough scale of the friendliness or
hostility of, or toward, other nations. The re-
lationship is not necessarily either consistent
or reciprocal-in nation A the prevailing im-
age may be that B is friendly, whereas in
nation B itself the prevailing image may be
one of hostility toward A; or again in both
nations there may be an image of friendliness
of A toward B but of hostility of B toward
A. On the whole, however, there is a tend-
ency toward both consistency and reciproca-
tion-if a nation A pictures itself as hostile
toward B, it usually also pictures B as hostile
toward it, and the image is likely to be re-
peated in B. One exception to this rule seems
to be observable: most nations seem to feel
that their enemies are more hostile toward
them than they are toward their enemies.
This is a typical paranoid reaction; the na-
tion visualizes itself as surrounded by hos-
tile nations toward which it has only the
nicest and friendliest of intentions.
An important subdimension of the hostil-
ity-friendliness image is that of the stability
or security of the relationship. A friendly
relationship is frequently formalized as an
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alliance. Alliances, however, are shifting;
some friendly relations are fairly permanent,
others change as the world kaleidoscope
changes, as new enemies arise, or as govern-
ments change. Thus a bare fifteen or twenty
years ago most people in the United States
visualized Germany and Japan, even before
the outbreak of the war, as enemies, and
after Hitler’s invasion of Russia, Russia was
for a while regarded as a valuable friend and
ally. Today the picture is quite changed:
Germany and Japan are valuable friends and
allies; Russia is the great enemy. We can
roughly classify the reciprocal relations of na-
tions along some scale of friendliness-hostil-
ity. At one extreme we have stable friendli-
ness, such as between Britain and Portugal
or between Britain and the Commonwealth
countries. At the other extreme we have sta-
ble hostility the &dquo;traditional enemies&dquo; such
as France and Germany. Between these ex-
tremes we have a great many pairs charac-
terized by shifting alliances. On the whole,
stable friendly relations seem to exist mainly
between strong nations and weaker nations
which they have an interest in preserving and
stable hostile relations between adjacent na-
tions each of which has played a large part
in the formation of the other.
Another important dimension both of the
image and of the &dquo;reality&dquo; of the nation-state
is its strength or weakness. This is, in turn,
a structure made up of many elements-eco-
nomic resources and productivity, political
organization and tradition, willingness to in-
cur sacrifice and inflict cruelties, and so on.
It still makes some kind of sense to assess
nations on a strength-weakness scale at any
one time. Strength is frequently thought of in
military terms as the ability to hurt an op-
ponent or to prevent one’s self from being
hurt by him. There are also more subtle ele-
ments in terms of symbolic loyalties and
affections which are hard to assess but which
must be included in any complete picture.
Many arrays of bristling armaments have
been brought low by the sheer inability of
their wielders to attract any lasting respect
or affection. No social organization can sur-
vive indefinitely unless it can command the
support of its members, and a continuing
sense of the significance of the organization
or group as such is much more durable a
source of support than is the fleeting booty
of war or monopoly. The Jews have outlasted
an impressive succession of conquerors.
These questions regarding the ultimate
sources of continuing strength or weakness
are difficult, and we shall neglect them in
this paper.
In order to bring together the variables
associated with each nation or pair of nations
into an international system, we must resort
to the device of a matrix, as in Figure 1. Here
the hostility-friendliness variable is used as
an example. Each cell, a,,, indicates the de-
gree of hostility or friendliness of nation I
(of the row) toward nation J (of the column).
For purposes of illustration, arbitrary figures
have been inserted on a scale from 5 to -5,
-5 meaning very hostile, 5 very friendly, and
0 neutral.4 A matrix of this kind has many
4 The problem of the measurement of hostility
(or friendliness) is a very interesting one which
we cannot go into extensively here but which is
not so hopeless of solution as might at first sight
appear. Possible avenues are as follows: (1) A
historical approach. Over a period of years two
nations have been at war, threatening war, allied,
bound by treaty, and so on. Each relation would
be given an arbitrary number, and each year
assigned a number accordingly: the average of
the years’ numbers would be the index. This
would always yield a symmetrical matrix&mdash;that
is, the measure of I’s relation to J would be the
same as J’s relation to I, or aij = aji. (2) An ap-
proach by means of content analysis of public
communications (official messages, newspaper
editorials, public speeches, cartoons, etc.). This
seems likely to be most immediately useful and
fruitful, as it would give current information and
would also yield very valuable dynamic informa-
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interesting properties, not all of which can
be worked out here but which depend on the
kind of restraints that we impose on it. If we
suppose, for instance, that the relations of na-
tions are reciprocal, so that 1’s attitude to-
ward J is the same as J’s toward I, the matrix
becomes symmetrical about its major diago-
nal-that is, the lower left-hand triangle is a
mirror image of the upper right-hand tri-
angle. This is a very severe restriction and is
certainly violated in fact: there are unre-
quited loves and hates among the nations as
there are among individuals. We can recog-
nize a tendency, however, for the matrix to
become symmetrical. There is a certain insta-
bility about an unrequited feeling. If I loves 7
and J hates I, then either J’s constant rebuff
of 1’s affections will turn 1’s love to hate, or
1’s persistant wooing will break down J’s dis-
taste and transform it into affection. Unfor-
tunately for the history of human relations,
tion about the changes in the matrix, which may
be much more important than the absolute fig-
ures. The fact that any measure of this kind is
highly arbitrary is no argument against it, pro-
vided that it is qualitatively reliable&mdash;that is,
moves generally in the same direction as the vari-
able which it purports to measure&mdash;and provided
also that the limitations of the measure are clear-
ly understood. It would probably be advisable to
check the second type of measure against the
more objective measures derived from the first
method. The difficulty of the first method, how-
ever, is the extreme instability of the matrix. The
affections of nations are ephemerall
Fic.1 
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the former seems to be the more frequent pat-
tern, but the latter is by no means unknown.5 ITS
The sum totals of the rows represent the
over-all friendliness or hostility of the nation
at the head of the row; the sum totals of the
columns represent the degree of hostility or
friendliness toward the nation at the head of
the column. The sum of either of these sums
(which must be equal, as each represents a
way of adding up all the figures of the matrix)
feeling hostile toward everyone and receiving
hostility in return; D is a &dquo;neutral&dquo; nation,
with low values for either hostility or friend-
liness ; E is a &dquo;friendly&dquo; nation, reciprocating
B’s general hostility but otherwise having
positive relations with everyone. In this figure
it is evident that A, C, and E are likely to be
allied against B, and D is likely to be uncom-
mitted.
In the matrix of Figure l’ no account is
Fic. 2
is a measure of the over-all friendliness or
hostility of the system. In the example of
Figure 1, B is evidently a &dquo;paranoid&dquo; nation,
taken of the relative size or power of the dif-
ferent nations. This dimension of the system
can easily be accommodated, however. All
that is necessary is to take the power of the
smallest nation as a convenient unit and ex-
press the power of the others in multiples of
this unit. Then in the matrix we simply give
each nation a number of places along the
axes equal to the measure of its power. Thus
in Figure 2 we suppose a system of three
nations, where B is twice as powerful as C
and A is three times as powerful as C; A is
5 George F. Kennan once said: "It is an un-
deniable privilege of every man to prove him-
self in the right in the thesis that the world is
his enemy; for if he reiterates it frequently
enough and makes it the background of his con-
duct, he is bound eventually to be right" ("The
Roots of Soviet Conduct," Foreign Affairs, July,
1947). If for "enemy" we read "friend" in this
statement, the proposition seems to be equally
true but much less believed.
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then allotted three spaces along the axes, B
two, and C one. The analysis of the matrix
proceeds as before, with the additional con-
straint that all the figures in the larger boxes
bounded by the lines which divide the na-
tions should be the same, as in the figure.
The difference between the sum of a na-
tion’s column, representing the general de-
gree of support or affection it receives, and
the sum of a nations row, representing the
sum of support or affection it gives, might
be called its affectional balance. This is shown
in the row X in Figure 1. It is a necessary
property of a matrix of this kind that the
sum of all these balances shall be zero. They
measure the relative position of each nation
in regard to the degree of support it can ex-
pect from the international system as a whole.
Thus in Figure 1 it is clear that B is in the
worst position, and C in the best position,
vis-à-vis the system as a whole. Another fig-
ure of some interest might be called the
affectional contribution, shown in the line Y.
This is the mean of the column and row totals
for each nation. The total affectional contri-
bution is equal to the total of all the figures
of the matrix, which measures the general
hostility or friendliness of the whole system.
The affectional contribution is then a rough
measure of how much each nation contributes
to the general level of hostility of the whole
system. Thus in the example of Figure 1 we
see that nation B (the paranoid) actually
contributes more than 100 per cent to the
total hostility of the system, its extreme hos-
tility being offset to some extent by other na-
tions’ friendliness.
One critical problem of an international
system, then, is that of the dynamics of the
hostility matrix. We can conceive of a suc-
cession of such matrices at successive points
of time. If there is a system with a &dquo;solution,&dquo;
we should be able to predict the matrix at t,
from the knowledge we have of the matrix
at to or at various earlier times. The matrix
itself will not, in general, carry enough in-
formation to make such predictions possible,
even though it is easy to specify theoretical
models in which a determinate dynamic sys-
tem can be derived from the information in
the matrix alone.6 6
The difficulty with &dquo;simple&dquo; systems of this
nature is that they are very much more simple
than the reality which they symbolize. This
is because, in reality, the variables of the sys-
tem consist of the innumerable dimensions
of the images of large numbers of people, and
the dynamics of the image are much more
complex than the dynamics of mechanical
systems. This is because of the structural na-
ture of the image; it cannot be represented
simply by a set of quantities or variables.
Because of this structural nature, it is capable
occasionally of very dramatic changes as a
message hits some vital part of the structure
and the whole image reorganizes itself. Cer-
tain events-like the German invasion of Bel-
gium in 1914, the Japanese attack on Pearl
Harbor in 1941, the American use of the atom
bomb at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the merci-
less destruction of Dresden, and the Russian
success with Sputnik I-have profound effects
and possibly long-run effects on reorganizing
the various national images. The &dquo;reorganiz-
ing&dquo; events are hard both to specify and to
predict; they introduce, however, a marked
element of uncertainty into any dynamic in-
ternational system which does not exist, for
instance, in the solar systeml
----------------------------------------------------------
6 As a very simple example of such a system,
let (aij)tbe a cell of the matrix at time t and
(aij)t + 1 be the corresponding value at time
t + 1. Then if for each cell we can postulate a
function (aij)t+1= F(aij)t, we can derive the
whole t + 1 matrix from the t matrix. This is
essentially the dynamic method of Lewis F.
Richardson, and in fairly simple cases it provides
an interesting way of formulating certain aspects
of the system, especially its tendency toward
cumulative movements of hostility (arms races)
or occasionally of friendliness.
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In spite of this dif&culty, which, oddly
enough, is particularly acute in short-term
prediction, one gets the impression from the
observation of history that we are in the pres-
ence of a true system with a real dynamic of
its own. We do observe, for instance, cumu-
lative processes of hostility. If we had some
measures of the hostility matrix, however
crude, it would be possible to identify these
processes in more detail, especially the &dquo;turn-
ing points.&dquo; There is an analogy here with
the business cycle, which also represents a
system of cumulative stochastic processes
subject to occasional &dquo;reorganizations&dquo; of its
basic equations. Just as we can trace cumula-
tive upward and downward movements in
national income, the downward movements
often (though not always) culminating in
financial crisis and the upward movements
often leading to inflation and a subsequent
downturn, so we can trace cumulative move-
ments in the hostility matrix. We have &dquo;pre-
war&dquo; periods corresponding to downswings,
in which things go from bad to worse and
hostility constantly increases. The total of all
the hostility figures (e.g., -$ on Fig. 1) is a
striking analogue of the national-income con-
cept. It might be called the &dquo;international
temperature.&dquo; Just as there is a certain criti-
cal point in a deflation at which a financial
crisis is likely to ensue because of the grow-
ing insolvency of heavily indebted businesses,
so there is a critical point in the rise of hostil-
ity at which war breaks out. This critical point
itself depends on a number of different fac-
tors and may not be constant. Some nations
may be more tolerant of hostility than others;
as the cost of war increases, the tolerance of
hostility also increases, as we see today in the
remarkable persistence of the &dquo;cold war.&dquo; A
deflation or downturn, however, may reverse
itself without a crisis, and a &dquo;prewar&dquo; period
may turn into a &dquo;postwar&dquo; period without a
war. Indeed, in the period since 1945 we
might identify almost as many small intema-
tional cycles as there have been business
cycles! The &dquo;upturn&dquo; may be a result of a
change of government, the death of certain
prominent individuals, or even a change of
heart (or image!) on the part of existing
rulers. The catharsis of a war usually pro-
duces the typical &dquo;postwar&dquo; period following,
though this is often tragically short, as it was
after the end of World War II, when a &dquo;down-
turn&dquo; began after the revolution in Czecho-
slovakia. The downturn is often the result of
the reassertion of a persistent, long-run char-
acter of the system after a brief interlude of
increasing friendliness. There seems to be a
certain long-run tendency of an international
system toward hostility, perhaps because of
certain inescapable flaws in the very concept
of a national image, just as there also seems
to be a long-run tendency of an unregulated
and undisturbed market economy toward
deflation.
In considering the dynamics of an interna-
tional system, the essential properties of the
image matrix might be summed up in a broad
concept of &dquo;compatibility.&dquo; If the change in
the system makes for greater compatibility
the system may move to an equilibrium. The
&dquo;balance-of-power&dquo; theory postulates the
existence of an equilibrium of this nature.
The record of history, however, suggests that,
in the past at least, international systems
have usually been unstable. The incompati-
bility of various national images has led to
changes in the system which have created
still greater incompatibility, and the system
has moved to less and less stable situations
until some crisis, such as war, is reached,
which represents a discontinuity in the sys-
tem. After a war the system is reorganized;
some national units may disappear, others
change their character, and the system starts
off again. The incompatibility may be of
many kinds, and it is a virtue of this kind
of rather loose model that the historian can
fill in the endlessly various details in the spe-
130
cial situations which he studies. The model
is a mere dress form on which the historian
swathes the infinite variations of fashion and
fact.
In the model we can distinguish two very
different kinds of incompatibility of images.
The first might be called &dquo;real&dquo; incompatibil-
ity, where we have two images of the future
in which realization of one would prevent
the realization of the other. Thus two nations
may both claim a certain piece of territory,
and each may feel dissatisfied unless the ter-
ritory is incorporated into it. (One thinks of
the innumerable irredenta which have
stained the pages of history with so much
bloodl ) Or two nations may both wish to
feel stronger than, or superior to, each other.
It is possible for two nations to be in a posi-
tion where each is stronger than the other
at home, provided that they are far enough
apart and that the &dquo;loss of power gradient&dquo;
(which measures the loss of power of each
as we remove the point of application farther
and farther from the home base) is large
enough. It is rarely possible, however, for two
nations each to dominate the other, except
in the happy situation where each suffers
from delusions of grandeur.
The other form of incompatibility might
be called &dquo;illusory&dquo; incompatibility, in which
there exists a condition of compatibility
which would satisfy the &dquo;real&dquo; interests of the
two parties but in which the dynamics of the
situation or the illusions of the parties create
a situation of perverse dynamics and misun-
derstandings, with increasing hostility simply
as a result of the reactions of the parties to
each other, not as a result of any basic dif-
ferences of interest. We must be careful about
this distinction: even &dquo;real&dquo; incompatibilities
are functions of the national images rather
than of physical fact and are therefore subject
to change and control. It is hard for an ardent
patriot to realize that his country is a mental,
rather than a physical, phenomenon, but such
indeed is the truth! It is not unreasonable to
suppose, however, that &dquo;real&dquo; incompatibil-
ities are more intractable and less subject to
&dquo;therapy&dquo; than illusory ones.
One final point of interest concerns what
might be called the impact of &dquo;sophistica-
tion&dquo; or &dquo;self-consciousness&dquo; on national im-
ages and the international system. The
process of sophistication in the image is a
very general one, and we cannot follow all
its ramifications here. It occurs in every per-
son in greater or less degree as he grows
into adult awareness of himself as part of a
larger system. It is akin almost to a Coper-
nican revolution: the unsophisticated image
sees the world only from the viewpoint of
the viewer; the sophisticated image sees the
world from many imagined viewpoints, as
a system in which the viewer is only a part.
The child sees everything through his own
eyes and refers everything to his own im-
mediate comfort. The adult learns to see the
world through the eyes of others; his horizon
extends to other times, places, and cultures
than his own; he learns to distinguish be-
tween those elements in his experience
which are universal and those which are
particular. Many grown people, of course,
never become adults in this sense, and it is
these who fill our mental hospitals with
themselves and their children.
The scientific subculture is an important
agency in the sophistication of images. In
the physical world we no longer attribute
physical phenomena to spirits analogous to
our own. In the social sciences we have an
agency whereby men reach self-conscious-
ness about their own cultures and institu-
tions and therefore no longer regard these
as simply given to them by &dquo;nature.&dquo; In eco-
nomics, for instance, we have learned to see
the system as a whole, to realize that many
things which are true of individual behavior
are not true of the system and that the sys-
tem itself is not incapable of a modicum of
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control. We no longer, for instance, regard
depressions as &dquo;acts of God&dquo; but as system-
made phenomena capable of control through
relatively minor system change.
The national image, however, is the last
great stronghold of unsophistication. Not
even the professional international relations
experts have come very far toward seeing
the system as a whole, and the ordinary citi-
zen and the powerful statesman alike have
naive, self-centered, and unsophisticated im-
ages of the world in which their nation
moves. Nations are divided into &dquo;good&dquo; and
&dquo;bad&dquo;-the enemy is all bad, one’s own na-
tion is of spotless virtue. Wars are either
acts of God or acts of the other nations,
which always catch us completely by sur-
prise. To a student of international systems
the national image even of respectable, in-
tellectual, and powerful people seems naive
and untrue. The patriotism of the sophisti-
cated cannot be a simple faith. There is,
however, in the course of human history a
powerful and probably irreversible move-
ment toward sophistication. We can wise
up, but we cannot wise down, except at
enormous cost in the breakdown of civiliza-
tions, and not even a major breakdown re-
sults in much loss of knowledge. This move-
ment must be taken into account in predict-
ing the future of the international system.
The present system as we have known it
for the past hundreds or even thousands of
years is based on the widespread acceptance
of unsophisticated images, such as, for in-
stance, that a nation can be made more
secure merely by increasing its armaments.
The growth of a systems-attitude toward
international relations will have profound
consequences for the dynamics of the system
itself, just as the growth of a systems-atti-
tude in economics has profound conse-
quences for the dynamics of the economic
system.
If, as I myself believe, we live in an inter-
national system so unstable that it threatens
the very existence of life on earth, our main
hope for change may lie in the rapid growth
of sophistication, especially at the level of
the images of the powerful. Sophistication,
of course, has its dangers also. It is usually
but a hair’s-breadth removed from sophistry,
and a false sophistication (of which Marx-
ism in some respects is a good example) can
be even more destructive to the stability of
a system than a naive image. Whichever way
we move, however, there is danger. We have
no secure place to stand where we are, and
we live in a time when intellectual invest-
ment in developing more adequate interna-
tional images and theories of international
systems may bear an enormous rate of return
in human welfare.
